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Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Karim 
Massimov, once referred to energy 
cooperation as the ‘core’ of relations 
between his country and the 
European Union (EU). Indeed, there 
is great mutual interest in this area. 
Six percent of the EU’s crude oil 
imports and 16 percent of its uranium 
imports come from Kazakhstan. And 
around 80 percent of the latter’s 
oil exports go towards Europe. For 
Kazakhstani producers, access 
to European lucrative and reliable 
markets is of utmost importance. 
Over the last several years, the 
thrust of Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy was aimed at increasing the 
capacity of the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) that pumps 
Kazakhstani oil to Europe. Moreover, 
Kazmunaigaz’s (KMG) – the national 
oil and gas company – major external 
investment was in the Romanian oil 
company Rompetrol. 
EU access to Kazakhstani oil and 
uranium is in good order and both 
sides are happy to further develop their 
cooperation. But the question remains 
as to whether Brussels will also be able 
to secure Kazakhstani gas imports 
through the Southern Corridor project. 
This initiative intends to bring Caspian 
gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan to EU markets as a 
way to diversify supply and decrease 
the dependence on Russia-controlled 
gas transportation systems. 
So far, Brussels has been unable 
to secure the commitment of the 
Kazakhstani government in support of 
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP). 
In early October 2011, EU Energy 
Commissioner Guenther Oettinger 
attended the Eurasian KAZENERGY 
conference in Kazakhstan and 
once again welcomed the country’s 
participation in the Southern Corridor. 
Oettinger pointed out that the TCGP 
would comply with the highest level 
of European environmental standards 
(possible environmental damage 
to the Caspian Sea is one of the 
stumbling blocks of the project) and 
contribute to enhancing stability and 
prosperity in the region. Two days 
later, at another energy conference 
(KIOGE-2011), the Kazakhstani 
Deputy Minister of Oil and Gas, 
Lyazzat Kiyinov, indirectly accepted 
the invitation by acknowledging the 
need to build the TCGP, since without 
this pipeline it would be impossible 
to export gas via Nabucco. However, 
the biggest obstacle for Astana’s 
participation in these projects is 
the lack of available gas in the near 
future. Only once Kazakhstan starts 
producing more gas  it can consider 
the possibility of exporting it through 
the Southern Corridor.
This position is in line with Kazakhstan’s 
overall energy policy. While Astana 
wants to diversify export routes for 
its oil and gas, it is very careful not to 
enter into a confrontation with Russia. 
For instance, when Kazakhstan was 
desperately looking for outlets for its 
growing oil output, it showed interest in 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
project but did not fully commit to it 
in order to avoid upsetting Moscow. 
Kazakhstan only started using the 
route when it became operational.
To understand the prospects of 
Kazakhstan’s participation in the 
Southern Corridor, it is first necessary 
to consider two key questions: how 
much Kazakhstani gas will be available 
and when? And how much political will 
to support the project can be expected 
from the country’s leadership? 
While there is no gas available 
at present, the country has major 
reserves and production is growing 
rapidly. The Karachaganak field, which 
at the moment has an output of just 
under 20bcm – 40 percent of all gas 
produced in Kazakhstan – is planning 
an expansion. By 2015, it is expected 
that Kazakhstan will be able to export 
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more than 30bcm of gas (this year’s 
exports are estimated at 9.2 bcm). 
Thus, provided that this becomes 
a reality, there will be “blue fuel” 
available for the TCGP.
The question of political will is more 
complex and layered. If Kazakhstan 
wants to preserve what is left of its 
sovereignty after the launch of the 
Customs Union and Single Economic 
Space with Russia and Belarus, the 
country should continue its multi-vector 
foreign policy and strengthen ties with 
Europe. In his annual address earlier 
this year, President Nazarbayev spoke 
about the signing of an EU-Kazakhstan 
energy charter. The details of what it will 
consist of are unclear, as Astana has 
already entered a number of energy 
cooperation agreements with the EU 
and has joined the European Energy 
Charter. Nonetheless, the initiative may 
indicate a growing European-oriented 
Kazakhstani foreign policy and could 
increase the chances of Kazakhstan 
joining the Southern Corridor.
Alternatively, the leadership could 
decide that there is more political 
expediency in further integration with 
Russia in the oil and gas sector (the level 
of integration in the uranium production 
sector is already high). In June 
2011, the head of the KAZENERGY 
association of oil and gas companies 
and son-in-law of the President, Timur 
Kulibayev, joined the board of directors 
of Russia’s Gazprom. The fact that 
Moscow decided to invite Kulibayev 
to its key company could indicate the 
possibility of an important merger 
between the two national energy 
sectors. While important decisions on 
the direction of Kazakhstan’s energy 
policy are still pending, this move does 
not augur well for Europe. 
Two trends are already affecting EU-
Kazakhstan energy relations: resource 
nationalism and growing social 
tensions in oil-producing areas. Over 
the last few years, the Kazakhstani 
government has been using an array 
of methods (accusations of overstating 
costs and tax and ecological laws 
violations) to put pressure on foreign 
oil companies working in major fields 
to cede a share in the projects. In the 
Kashagan project, the government 
managed to acquire 16.8 percent. In the 
case of Karachaganak, negotiations 
are still ongoing, but it is agreed that 
the consortium between ENI, British 
Gas and Lukoil will cede 10 percent 
to the Kazakhstani KMG. While this 
creates a certain level of discomfort 
for European companies, they have 
grown accustomed to these practices 
(Russia had applied the same tactics) 
and profit margins are expected to 
remain worthwhile in any case.
On the other hand, growing social 
tensions can potentially create more 
problems. Since May 2011, over 
one thousand oil workers have been 
on strike in Western Kazakhstan, 
demanding better pay and job 
security. This has resulted in not only 
a decrease in production and exports, 
but has also created tensions between 
the Kazakhstani government and the 
European Parliament. In mid-July, 
MEP Paul Murthy visited the strikers 
and the European Parliament sent a 
letter to President Nazarbayev urging 
him to find a peaceful solution to the 
dispute. The Kazakhstani Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs officially criticised 
the visit and accused Paul Murthy 
of “interference into Kazakhstan’s 
internal affairs”. While strikes in 
themselves are not extraordinary, 
the inability of the government to find 
a solution after several months and 
the lack of institutional mechanisms 
might lead to further turbulences. This 
can affect the security of supply and 
complicate the life of European policy 
makers, torn between their interest in 
receiving Kazakhstani resources and 
that of promoting democratic reform 
and human rights. 
These hurdles, however, cannot 
stop the overall development of EU-
Kazakhstan energy cooperation.  The 
mutual interest is solid and strong. 
European investments, technologies 
and markets remain indispensable 
for Kazakhstan, and the country’s 
oil, gas and uranium reserves are 
highly attractive for Europeans. As 
for Kazakhstan’s participation in the 
Southern Corridor, it will only be 
possible if the TCGP becomes a reality. 
For the time being, Astana has decided 
to adopt a ‘wait and see’ position. 
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